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Introduction
While it is generally assumed that the structure of a game is well understood and common knowledge among players, some game theorists have challenged this assumption.
For example, Kreps (1990) has suggested that "in choosing his actions in the short run, the individual builds a model of his choice problem, a model which is typically a simplification or a misspecification (or both) of the 'true situation"' (pp. 152). However, how do individuals simplify or misspecify the 'true situation' is still a rather unexplored
issue.
An important early exception is Thomas Schelling's classic book, The strategy of conflict. Schelling reports John Strachey, the former British Defense Minister, telling him that although he had known that conflict could coexist with common interest, he had thought that the two were inherently separable, and had never considered them as part of an integrated structure (Schelling 1980, vi) . Strachey's words neatly capture an important idea in Schelling's (1960) book: that representing others' strategic motivations may be a source of cognitive difficulty for players when coordination and conflict motives are intertwined in the same game.
For this purpose Schelling introduces a basic and important distinction between "pure motive" and "mixed motive" games. The former are games in which preferences of players are rank-correlated, as in the protoypical examples of pure coordination games (positive correlation) and conflict games (negative correlation). The latter games present a more complex, non correlated structure of preferences, blending coordination opportunities with antagonistic motivations. The point Schelling makes is that while pure motive games are in general easy to grasp, mixed motive games are puzzling and inherently harder to understand. He strikingly remarks that while our vocabulary is rich of words designating common interest or adversarial relationships, there are no words to designate the relation between players in a mixed motive game 1 : while we have a rich lexicon for partners or for opponents, how to designate someone who is a partner
and an opponent at the same time?
A similar issue has sometimes surfaced in attempts to provide game theoretic prescriptive advice to decision makers. For example, Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff's (1996) bestseller makes a central argument that managers seldom correctly identify the peculiar mix of competition and cooperation hidden in most business interactions (they feel a revealing need to fill the gap in our dictionaries, coining the hybrid word: co-opetition). Furthermore, it has been repeatedly observed that often bargainers (both in the lab and in real negotiations) tend to miss opportunities to reach agreements on the efficient frontier due to the blinding effects of the "mythical fixed pie bias" (Bazerman 1983 ), inducing them to represent the intrinsically mixed-motive bargaining problem as a cognitively simpler constant sum game. Anecdotal evidence from the history of decision making also abounds; for example, Robert McNamara's (1999) recent reappraisal of "missed opportunities" during the Vietnam war provides a rich sample of episodes in which decision makers from both conflicting parties essentially failed to recognize the existence of possible cooperation within conflict and, more generally, recognizes misrepresentations -"wrong mindsets", in his words -of the nature of the ongoing interaction as a major driver of the evolution of the war.
In this paper, we experimentally address the issue of what makes it difficult for an individual to build a correct mental model of a strategic situation and, following
Schelling's intuition, we start by focusing on how different payoff structures present different challenges for the individuals' cognitive ability to represent the game correctly.
More specifically, we investigate the difficulty to correctly represent the relations of players' preferences over the game outcomes. For this purpose we introduce the notion of relational complexity of a two-person game representation, and we define it in terms of the structural properties of bi-orders representing the players' payoffs.
Since we want to investigate the extent to which strategic decision making is affected by misrepresentations of the underlying game structure, we proceed in two steps. First, we take a "semantic" stance, and look directly at the cognitive difficulties in representing intertwined order relations which are isomorphic to the preference structures of some classical games. We believe that this may help to disentangle representational factors from other cognitive and behavioral components, and may provide a broader perspective on the difficulties of representing interactive situations. Subsequently, we move to a classical decision making context, looking at how representation difficulties interact with actual decision making -i.e., how some puzzling behaviors may be interpreted in the light of erroneous underlying models of the game.
Our experimental results confirm the appropriateness of our classification for the purpose of understanding individual failures in representing complex relational structures. When facing games of high relational complexity, individuals tend to construct simpler representations, often of a pure-motive type. Thus, although introducing a finer classification, our results confirm that Schelling's insight was essentially correct, i.e., order relations associated to mixed motive games are significantly more difficult to represent than those mirroring pure motive games. We also show that failures in representing order structures of higher complexity are correlated with individual computational capability, as approximated by a measure of short term memory capacity.
In addition, we show that behavior of individuals misrepresenting games is consistent with their erroneous representations. In a way, such individuals play a different game, of a simpler nature. Moreover, since their misrepresentations are most of the time amenable to basic solution concepts, such subjects display behavior consistent with very simple but rational criteria such as dominance or selection of actions supporting payoffdominant equilibria.
Section 2 of the paper shortly introduces a formal classification of bi-ordered structures, which can be applied to preference relations in two-person games. For this purpose we introduce the property of projectivity. Projectivity and its complement (non-projectivity) well capture, in our view, the degree of entanglement of multiple order relations, as will be better clarified in the next section. Section 3 presents an experiment on the representation of bi-ordered structures and its relation to short term memory capacity. Section 4 describes a behavioral experiment in which the representation task is embedded in actual game playing. We analyze once more representational mistakes and relate them to the interpretation of subjects' strategic behavior. Finally, section 5 discusses some implications of our results and the relationship with other streams of research in behavioral game theory.
Bi-orders and Preference Structures
A game is usually composed of strategies, players (including Nature), and payoffs which determine the players' preferences over the set of outcomes. Sources of cognitive difficulty for individuals may in principle arise from any of these elements alone, or, possibly, from their combination. The complexity of the strategy space is indeed an important source of constraints to players' full rationality in games (chess being the paradigmatic example: e.g., Simon and Schaeffer, 1992) , as partisans of bounded rationality have often suggested, and as an abounding experimental evidence by now confirms.
Much less attention, however, has been paid so far to possible cognitive difficulties arising from the structure of preferences implied by a game 2 . complexity cannot arise from the action space, we suggest that one should look at the structure of players' preferences as an important source of difficulty for strategic thinking in such situations. After all, what distinguishes a game situation from an individual decision making task is the need to jointly take into account both one's own and the other players' preferences, and this may indeed result in non trivial complexity even in those cases in which the strategy space is not exceedingly complicated.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to simple, two-person normal form game structures. A peculiar feature of two-person strategic form games is that the outcomes of strategy profiles (i.e., the cells of the bi-matrix) constitute a bi-ordered set, as the preference order of both players is imposed on them. In order to reason strategically on the game, hence, a player must mentally represent two preference orders, her own and the other player's.
In general, bi-orders can have structures of different complexity. A useful typology of bi-orders, which originated in algebraic linguistics (Marcus, 1967; Schreider, 1975;  Mel'cuk, 1988) and which is largely used in the theory of parsing, distinguishes levels of intricacy in the interrelation between two orders on the same set using the properties of monotonicity and projectivity.
Before introducing a few formal definitions, an informal presentation of such properties may be useful.
A bi-order is a pair of order relations (say, ← and <) on a set S. Let's assume for the sake of simplicity that both relations are linear orders 3 . A bi-order is monotonic if one relation preserves the order of the other (the bi-order is isotonic) or it just reverses it (the bi-order is antitonic). Projectivity can be intuitively expressed by saying that if one writes down the sequence of elements of S according to the < relation, and draws the arrows directly subordinating (i.e., covering) the same elements according to ←, the 3 One can generalize definitions to non strict order relations and to the case in which one of the relations is a tree. See for example Schreider (1975) .
← covering arrows should never cross each other. Finally, a bi-order is non-projective when it is not projective. Non projectivity can be intuitively expressed by saying that there is no way to arrange the sequence of elements of S according to the < relationship, in such a way that the ← arrows never cross each other. Let a i , a j ∈ S, and let ← and < be two linear order relations defined on S; a doubly ordered set S is called isotonically projective if:
It is called antitonically projective if:
It is called monotonically projective if it is isotonically projective or antitonically projective.
DEFINITION 2: Projectivity:
Let a i , a j , a k ∈ S, and let ← and < be two linear order relations defined on S; furthermore, let be the covering relation of ← 4 . A doubly ordered set S is called projective if one and only one of the following conditions holds:
imply the relation a k ← a j . 4 The covering relation for linear orders is usually defined as follows (Davey and Priestley, 1990 ).
Given an ordered set A, a linear order relation ← and a i , a j , a k ∈ A, a j covers a i (a i a j ) if a i a j implies that there are no a k such that:
imply the relation a i ← a k .
DEFINITION 3: Non projectivity:
A bi-ordered set is called non projective if it is neither monotonically projective nor projective.
Since monotonic projectivity is nested into projectivity, one can naturally hypothesize a hierarchy of cognitive difficulty: monotonic projective structures are easier to represent than projective (but non monotonic) structures, which in turn are easier to represent than non projective ones. Furthermore, since antitonic projective structures require to reverse one order to obtain the other one, it is reasonable to expect that they may be (slightly) more difficult than isotonic projective structures. Linguistics provides some support to this claim in the domain of language. Language is a system that has multiple order structures simultaneously acting on it: there is the sequential order of words in a phrase, as well as many other layers of syntactical (and semantic) order.
For example, to parse a phrase we must be able to recognize and process altogether such order relations. A fairly well explored example is how the linear order of words relates to the dependency order -i.e. the order induced by head-modifier relations in a sentence. A dependency A-B (where A is the governing node of a syntactical tree)
is projective iff all the words between A and B are included in the sub-tree of B. For example, while "I solved only that same poignant question" is projective, "Solved only that same I poignant question" is non-projective (Schreider, 1975) . Empirical analysis (see Marcus (1967, ch. 6 for a review) has shown that near 100% of natural language sentences are projective (with non-projective sentences usually confined to literary usage). More recent, extensive empirical work substantially confirms these results. For example, an analysis of the so-called "Prague dependency treebank", coding a sample of about 30,000 Czech sentences, has found that less than 2% of the sentences are non-projective (Schwartz, 1998) . The importance of projectivity can be understood on the ground that such property allows to introduce a proper bracketing structure into the sentence: in other words, it allows to properly decompose the sentence itself into constituents. This in turn allows to manage complex sentences in the presence of working memory constraints (the interactions between working memory constraints, complex nested sentences, and understanding performance are analyzed in Just and Carpenter, 1992).
Two-person games are bi-ordered structures: our hypothesis is that the cognitive difficulty in representing a game should depend, among other things, on the specific structure of preferences. Pure motive games are monotonically projective structuresin which the two preference relations perfectly coincide -thus they are the easiest to represent; mixed motive games can be of two types: projective ones (like for example "chicken games") or non projective ones (like for example PD's). The latter should be harder to represent, and therefore understand, than the former.
3 Representing Bi-orders: Experiment 1
Description of the experiment and discussion of results
Our central claim is that there are cognitive constraints in jointly representing multiple order relationships. These constraints seem not specific of game playing only, as the example of language suggests. Thus, we expect them to emerge in more general representational tasks. In order to test our hypothesis, we designed a simple experiment in which subjects were provided with a set of objects that could be ordered by two types of order relations and had to select a subset of them that satisfied such order relations.
In semantic terms, the task consists in representing a state of affairs (a "world") that satisfies a formula built up with two order relations. In particular, we tested the hypothesis that different bi-orders induce different levels of representational difficulty. As the reader will remind, we hypothesize the following order of difficulty: non projective ⊲ projective (but non monotonic) ⊲ antitonically projective ⊲ isotonically projective, with ⊲ indicating the "more difficult than" relation.
The elements our experimental subjects had to deal with were squares which differed along the two features of SIZE and COLOR (actually, shades of grey). Squares are very familiar objects, and size and color are equally familiar order relations, henceforth we expected that no peculiar difficulties could arise in understanding the task. A set of 16 squares was shown to subjects, and their task was to select, out of this set, four squares which would satisfy simultaneously two order relations (size and color) given to them. The experiment was computerized, of the "drag and drop" type ( In fact, the reader can easily check that the structure of payoffs in the coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria is isotonically projective. The pure conflict game corresponds to the case of antitonic projectivity. The projective case is drawn using the chicken game as a template, while the non-projective case is modelled after a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Thus, the following four pairs of order relations were presented to subjects:
• isotonic projectivity (monotonic)
• antitonic projectivity (monotonic)
• projectivity (non-monotonic)
• non-projectivity
S denotes SIZE and C denotes COLOR. The four squares are labelled X, Y, Z, and W.
A first experimental session was conducted at the University of Venice, and it involved a pool of 30 subjects who were students enrolled in a Master in Business Administration. The subjects had a monetary incentive to give correct responses in the experiment, as they were paid a fixed fee for their participation, plus an amount of 3 euros for each correct answer. The pool was divided into two sub-groups in which the order of presentation of the four bi-orders was varied, to control for learning effects.
The experiment was subsequently replicated with identical conditions at the Computable and Experimental Economics Lab of the University of Trento, using a pool of 40 undergraduate students recruited by posting ads at the various department buildings. Table 5 reports the numbers and relative frequencies of correct responses per task in the Venice and Trento pools respectively, distinguishing between the two sub-groups.
= Table 5 Clearly, aggregate analysis alone is not sufficiently informative in this experiment, as the single observations (performance in each task) are not independent. Hence, we performed non-parametric tests on the individual strings of successes (1) and failures (0) in the four tasks to test against the null hypothesis that successes and failures were randomly distributed.
A Cochran test performed on the four related samples allows to reject the null hypothesis that the correct answers in the tasks are equally distributed at the 1% significance level 6 . We can hence reject the null hypothesis that the four tasks presented an identical level of difficulty for our subjects.
23 subjects made no mistakes in any of the four tasks, while 2 subjects made the highest possible number (4) of mistakes. Disregarding these 25 subjects' performances as noninformative, out of the remaining 45 subjects, 35 (78%) behaved in accordance with our conjecture, i.e., they made mistakes in a way that did not violate our hypothesized hierarchy of difficulty. More specifically, 17 subjects made a mistake only in the non-projective task, 9 constructed both monotonic bi-orders correctly but made mistakes in the projective and non-projective tasks, and 9 correctly constructed only the We subsequently made pairwise comparisons by applying a McNemar test. All differences between pairs are statistically significant (Isotonic-antitonic bi-order: p = .002; isotonic-non-projective bi-order: p = .000; isotonic-projective bi-order: p = .000; antitonic-non projective bi-order: p = .022; non projective-projective bi-order: p = .003; McNemar test) except the difference between the antitonic and the projective bi-order (p = .096), which is only weakly significant. 6 Cochran's Q = 52.796, p = .000.
Hence, the data strongly confirm our hypothesis in all but the antitonic-projective pair, although also in this last case observed frequencies of mistakes are as expected.
Additional insight can be gained by conducting an analysis of the most common types of errors that subjects made. While mistakes in the "projective" task show a relatively high variance, mistakes in the "non-projective" task show a rather revealing pattern. In fact, of the thirty-nine subjects who did not answer correctly in this task, twenty (51.3%) constructed an antitonic bi-order, while fifteen (38.5%) constructed an isotonic bi-order.
Thus, as we hypothesized, individuals, out of a non-projective pair of relations, tend to simplify their representations by perceiving and extracting monotonic bi-orders.
Short-term Memory Capacity and Representation
Why should some bi-order structures be harder to represent than others? Research in the psychology of mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) has repeatedly -although not conclusively -suggested that short -term memory constraints may hinder the individual ability to edit a complete, accurate mental representation of a given task-environment.
Since the pioneering work of George Miller (1956) , it is well-known that individuals can hold only a limited amount of information active in their short-term memory, which is a basic bottleneck in human information processing. Thus, complex structures may overload individual short-term memory capacity, causing incomplete, over-simplified and often mistaken representations of these structures. The load on short-term memory capacity, however, may be reduced by the ability to compress information or decompose it into smaller components.
Clearly, bi-ordered structures differ in the way information can be compressed or It has been shown that individuals differ in their short-term memory capacity (Miller, 1956; Baddeley, 1990) . Hence, if short-term memory capacity limitations are a source of difficulty in representing bi-orders, one should expect the performance of individuals in our experiment to be correlated with their memory capacity.
In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted a standard Wechsler digit span test for short-term memory capacity (e.g., Walsch and Betz, 1990; see also Devetag and Warglien, 2003 for a related experiment) on 38 of the 40 subjects of the Trento pool in a separate experimental session. This simple test consists in asking subjects to repeat a series of digits which are to be read by the experimenter at the rate of one digit per second. The test is conducted sequentially on two independent sets of digit series of increasing length. For each set, the test stops when the participant fails to correctly repeat a given series. The subject's 'score' in each set is given by the length of the last series that was repeated correctly (so, for example, if a subject fails to correctly repeat a series of length 6, her score will be equal to 5). The subject's final score is then given by the higher among the two scores that were achieved in the sets. Although the score needs not directly reflect the number of 'short-term memory slots' available to an individual, it is generally assumed that higher scores correspond to a higher short-term memory capacity.
We computed the correlation between subjects'score in the memory test and the total number of correct responses in the representation experiment. The Spearman rho coefficient equals .310, and the Kendall tau rank-correlation coefficient equals .362 (p < .05, one-tailed for both coefficients). Hence, both tests support our hypothesis of a significant correlation between individual short-term memory capacity and performance in the experiment.
= Table 6 here = Table 6 reports the mean STM score of subjects who were successful and of those who were unsuccessful in each of the four tasks. A T-test performed on average scores in the two samples reveals statistically significant differences in the case of the conflict and chicken games, while the differences in the coordination game and the PD are not significant. A plausible explanation for these results, besides the small data sample in the coordination case, is that differences in short term memory bounds are likely to emerge more strongly in tasks of intermediate difficulty. In fact, if the task is very easy most people can solve it no matter how low their memory capacity is, and if the task is very difficult the workload is such that even people with high scores can make mistakes, as our data on the coordination game and the PD show. 
Experiment 2: Representation of games and links with behavior

Experimental design and implementation
Having verified the cognitive difficulty of representing different classes of bi-orders, our second experiment is aimed at assessing how these difficulties affect game playing. For this purpose, we designed an experiment in which subjects had to construct a representation of the four games depicted in tables 1-4, and subsequently choose a strategy in each game. The experiment was divided in two parts. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were told that in the second part they would participate in four interactive decision making tasks, and in each task they would be paired with a randomly selected opponent. In each decision making task each player could choose between two available moves. The four resulting combinations of choices generated four different scenarios The instructions stated that the representational task was strictly individual and that earnings in that task were solely a function of the number of games correctly represented, whereas earnings in the second part were contingent on one's own and one's opponent choices in the games. In order to emphasize the effects of working memory constraints we introduced a time limit of 120 seconds to complete each representation, and the four games appeared to each subject in a random order to control for learning effects.
In the second part of the experiment, each subject's computer terminal displayed the four representations that she had constructed in the first part, one at a time, and the subject had to choose a move between the two available. Hence, subjects had to play the games according to the representation that they themselves had constructed, knowing they would be randomly paired with a different opponent in each game, and all this information was common knowledge. The instructions also specified that in the case a subject had not been able to complete a representation within the time limit, the representation would be constructed arbitrarily by the computer program. Furthermore, who were all undergraduate students who had never participated in similar experiments before. Instructions were distributed at read aloud at the beginning of the experiment.
The overall time limit for the first part was set equal to eight minutes, whereas no time constraint was imposed in the second part. There was a show up fee of 3 euros plus anything subjects could earn in the experiment. Average overall earnings were equal to 14.8 euros; the experiment lasted sixty minutes on average, including the instruction time. 7 A figure displaying the graphical interface used in the second part can be downloaded from www.unipg.it/˜devetag/Instructions GEB.htm. Table 7 reports the frequencies of correct responses in each representation task. The observed frequencies in the different games mirror very closely those in experiment 1.
Results
The Cochran test performed on the four samples is highly significant (p = .000). Likewise, pairwise differences measured by a McNemar test are all statistically significant (coordination-chicken game: p = .002; coordination-PD: p = .000; conflict-chicken game: p = .029; conflict-PD: p = .000; chicken-PD: p = .032), although the difference between the coordination and the conflict games is only weakly so (p = .10).
23 subjects made no mistakes in any of the four tasks, and 4 subjects made four mistakes. Hence, there is a total of 41 subjects who made from 1 to 3 mistakes, and whose performance is therefore informative. A qualitative analysis of the individuals strings of successes (1) and failures (0) reveals that 26 out of 41 strings (63%) are strictly consistent with our hypothesized hierarchy of difficulty, against the 22% that would be expected in case of randomly distributed errors (the difference is significant at the .001 level by a Chi-square test) 8 .
We then move to an in-depth analysis of the mistaken representations, which we restrict to the chicken game and to the Prisoner's Dilemma, because the number of errors in these two tasks is sufficiently high.
Our conjecture is that the erroneously reconstructed matrices should diverge from the correct ones in terms of their relational structure, and in particular that they should reflect the difficulty of representing complex bi-orders. Table 8 reports the empirical distribution of mistaken games classified by type of bi-order. The numbers in parentheses report how many subjects chose a best reply given their (mistaken) representation. A useful benchmark is the distribution of possible classes of bi-orders in 2X2 matrices. It turns out that, out of the 4! = 24 possible 2X2 matrices that one can build, only 1 is isotonic, only 1 is antitonic, 14 are projective and 8 are non-projective. In both the chicken and the PD case, the distribution of types of biorders generated by our subjects significantly differs from such distribution (p = .0003
for the PD case, and p = .02 for the chicken case, according to a Chi-squared test with simulated p-value, 1,000,000 replicates). Furthermore, according to the same test, the "erroneous PD" distribution is significantly different from the "erroneous chicken" one (p = .002). In other words, mistakes in the PD and in the chicken game are drawn from different distributions.
Thus, representational errors are not random. In both cases, they show more isotonic/antitonic instances and less projective/non projective ones than randomly expected (p < .01, one-tailed Fisher exact test). At the same time, mistakes seem to reflect the structure of the underlying representation problem: there are more projective than nonprojective mistaken representations in the chicken game, and the reverse holds in the case of PD (p = .04, one-tailed Fisher exact test). Moreover, the chicken game is more often associated with isotonic representations than with antitonic ones, while the reverse is true for the PD game (p = 0.01, one-tailed Fisher exact test). Thus, the chicken game is often transformed into a coordination game, while the PD game is often transformed into a pure conflict game, although sometimes it still is transformed into a coordination
game.
An important issue is how representations interact with actual choice behavior. As far as subjects that represent the games correctly are concerned, choices in the four games conform to well-established behavioral principles (see table 9 ). In the coordination game, subjects predominantly play the strategy that supports the payoff dominant equilibrium, although, especially when the two strategies have the same payoff sum, as in the case of row players, many play the alternative, safer strategy. In the con-flict game the distribution of behavior is different from the mixed strategy equilibrium probabilities, due to a large extent to the fact that subjects take into consideration the weight of out-of-equilibrium payoffs, as related experiments have shown (e.g., Goeree
and Holt, 2001). In the chicken game, the safer deferential action is more often played than the more risky and aggressive one. Finally, in the PD about 2/3 of players defect, but another third is cooperating.
Looking at the behavior of those who have misrepresented the game is more informative. We have suggested that, in general, when misrepresenting a game subjects tend to generate representations which are structurally simpler than the "correct" one. Often these representations also imply simple solution criteria. As a result, although subjects often construct the wrong game representation, they act quite rationally in the light of such erroneous constructs.
The data reported in table 8 which the equilibrium in dominant strategies for both players is also the social optimum.
In summary, no matter whether they cooperate or defect according to the labels that apply in the "true" game, most players that erroneously reconstructed the PD represented it in such a way that the social optimum is also an equilibrium.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our experiments provide support for the view that not all normal form games are the "same", and that structural complexity matters; we suggest that besides the strategy space, relational structure is a further source of cognitive difficulty, providing a finer classification of two-person games. "Pure motive" games (i.e. monotonic payoff structures) are easier to represent, and even in the presence of "mixed motive" games, such simpler structures act as irresistible templates of interaction. We also show that a further classification, involving the property of projectivity, is useful in defining levels of relational complexity.
We also show that the same ranking of representational difficulty applies when biorders are explicitly embedded in the presentation of a game. Subjects aware that they are setting the stage for interactive decisions experience the same increasing difficulty as the payoff structure goes from isotonicity to non-projectivity. The analysis of the behavior of subjects that misrepresent the games reveals a few relevant features. 1)
Subjects tend to simplify representations, constructing models of the game that lower its relational complexity. 2) In doing so, they still anchor to some structural features of the "true" game. For example, in the PD, subjects still generate more non-projective erroneous representations than in the chicken game. Furthermore, other features of the correct game are preserved, although probably as a bi-product of other representational processes; for example, dominance is preserved in most erroneous PD's, whereas multiplicity of equilibria emerges in many erroneous chicken games. Given such simplified representations, actual choice behavior follows simple but quite "rational" decision criteria, such as dominance or selection of actions implementing payoff-dominant equilibria. These results suggest a fresh reinterpretation of behavior in well known experimental games. We have shown that when subjects misrepresent the PD game, they tend to eliminate its social dilemma nature, in a way that both the "cooperation" and "defection" moves actually correspond to strategies that support perceived social optima.
Similarly, behavior in the chicken game can be sometimes interpreted as the result of its subjective reframing as a coordination game with a payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Other well-documented behaviors find a natural interpretation in this framework.
For example, a large literature in negotiation research has pointed out that bargainers are often subjects to the "mythical fixed pie bias" (Bazerman, 1983) , which causes them to wrongly assume that their interests are diametrically opposed. "The assumption of a fixed pie is rooted in social norms that lead us to interpret most competitive situations as win-lose [...]. Humans tend to generalize from these objective win-lose situations to situations that are not necessarily win-lose" (Bazerman, Baron and Shonk, 2001, p.
13). Within our framework, the fixed pie bias is almost literally the transformation of a complex bargaining game into a simpler, antitonic, antagonistic representation. Some further evidence in this sense comes from a recent experiment on complex multi-issue negotiations (Hyder, Prietula, and Weingart, 2000) . The authors of the study observe that negotiators rarely achieve a Pareto-optimal solution to a given negotiation problem, and they argue that the reason lies in their incorrect 'default' representation of the situation as a zero-sum game. In fact, representing the game as zero-sum would trigger the almost exclusive use of distributive negotiation tactics (i.e., tactics aimed at achieving unilateral concessions from the other party) at the expense of integrative tactics, which would instead facilitate the achievement of agreements resulting in gains for both parties involved. Hence, the use of specific behavioral strategies conducting to sub-optimal agreements seems to derive, according to the authors, by an original failure of players to represent the mutual gain area in the space of solution points.
Incidentally, it should be noted that games that present a more complex structure are also more likely to be affected by superficial cues or attention-directing devices pointing to some simpler interaction structure. Such cues might act as cognitive af- In addition, our results point to an important source of heterogeneity in a population of game players, namely differences in the relative ability to correctly represent the structure of strategic interaction. These differences are in parallel with observed differences in the depth of iterated thinking in games (e.g., Nagel, 1995 , Camerer, 2003 , ch.
5; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002). Interestingly enough, both types of heterogeneity appear to be (weakly) correlated with differences in short term memory capacity, a measurable psychological proxy of individual computational capability (Newell and Simon, 1972; Devetag and Warglien, 2003; Kareev, 1992) . These observations may also help understand how players transfer behavior from previously experienced games to new ones. Knez and Camerer (2000) show that after playing a common interest coordination game, individuals are more prone to cooperate in a PD. We suggest that the coordination game may act as a template for the cognitive simplification of the subsequent PD.
In fact, our taxonomy may help to predict the direction of transfer phenomena from simpler to more complex games.
Furthermore, we submit that monotonic structures may indeed be the prevailing templates of bi-orders available in memory. In a classroom experiment, students asked to provide examples of four arbitrary objects satisfying simultaneously two arbitrary order relations of the kind depicted in fig. 1 had no difficulties in finding examples for monotonic bi-orders (such as "richer is happier" or "larger towns are less healthy"); but they found it almost impossible to provide examples for non-projective bi-orders. This point reinforces the result that in our experiment subjects unable to provide a solution to the non-projective case resorted to monotonic orderings of the squares. Returning to games, it also suggests that in incomplete information games "friends" and "enemies" may be the most natural player types.
Our results may also provide some complementary cognitive ground to Ariel Rubinstein's (1996) argument on the prevalence of linear order structures in discourse.
Rubinstein claims that linear orders have some efficiency properties (in indicating an element out of a set, in being informative about a relation on a set, in minimizing the number of examples necessary to describe a relation) that justify the higher frequency with which these structures appear in natural language. Clearly, one can construct a structure-preserving map from a monotonic bi-order to a linear order, either directly (as theory has so far relied on the implicit assumption that the game subjects played was the one provided by the experimenter. Our data suggest that this assumption may be misleading, and that, more generally, individuals may indeed apply optimal decision criteria to a misspecified strategic setting. A game of conflict (antitonic bi-order)
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